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Abstract: 
 
Pablo Escobar was a Colombian drug lord and leader of the Medellín Cartel 
which at one point controlled as much as 80% of the international cocaine trade. He is 
famous for waging war against the Colombian government in his campaign to outlaw 
extradition of criminals to the United State and ordering the assassination of countless 
individuals, including police officers, journalists, and high ranking officials and 
politicians. He is also well known for investing large sums of his fortune in charitable 
public works, including the construction of schools, sports fields and housing 
developments for the urban poor. While U.S. and Colombian officials have portrayed 
Escobar as a villain and terrorist who held the entire nation hostage, many people among 
the Colombian popular class admire him as a generous benefactor, like a Colombian 
Robin Hood. Decades of political turmoil and unprecedented violent conflict had left the 
Colombian lower class alienated and disenfranchised, creating the ideal conditions for a 
Robin Hood figure like Escobar to emerge and redistribute wealth among the poor. From 
the other perspective, Escobar threatened to destabilize the Colombian political and 
justice system and became a political target in the United States’ international War on 
Drugs. This thesis will examine the origins of both of these social constructions, the 
villain and the Robin Hood, within Colombian society and politics and in regards to the 
criteria of the development of similar outlaw hero legends.
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PREFACE 
 My fascination with Colombia began long before I started searching for an 
Honor’s Thesis topic and before I had even heard of Pablo Escobar.1 Like most 
Americans, my first perception of the country was that it was a land of coffee and cocaine 
plagued by corruption and violence. Clearly, while not entirely untrue, this stereotype 
represents only a vague and very incomplete image of Colombia’s identity. My first 
significant exposure to the country came while I was in my high school Spanish class. 
We watched the film “María, llena eres de gracia,” the story of a pregnant teenage girl 
who, out of desperation, turns to smuggling cocaine into the United States by swallowing 
dozens of pellets and carrying them inside her stomach.  While reinforcing the drug-
smuggling stereotype, the film was also a striking glimpse into the world of many 
Colombians with whom I could identify and their personal struggles that were very 
distinct from anything I had seen before. 
 In the same class, we also read short stories from Gabriel García Márquez, which 
I have often returned to and have become some of my favorite pieces of literature.  The 
Colombia I saw in these works was completely different from the images I had seen in 
other places.  García Márquez’s Colombia was vibrant and alive, full of colorful 
personalities with a magical yet ordinary element that captivated me.  Later I would learn 
about “magical-realism” as a genre, but at the time I was simply intrigued by the way he 
blended superstition and fantasy so seamlessly into depictions of day-to-day life.  I was 
also exposed to popular Colombian music, including Shakira, who is still my personal 
favorite. While she was already popular in the United States for a handful of pop songs, I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See Appendix I: Topographic map of Colombia.	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began to discover some of her less well-known music and found that I identified very 
strongly with her songwriting and image, especially compared with many of the popular 
American female artists. 
 Starting my first year at the University of Maine, I had two distinct ideas of 
Colombia.  One was the violent, corrupt, drug-producing Colombia that I heard about in 
the news and the other was the beautiful and unique country that produced great artists 
and authors. In 2011, I was looking for a way to travel abroad for the learning experience 
and to practice my Spanish before I went for an entire semester study-abroad. I found an 
affordable volunteer program and booked my tickets to Bogotá for spring break. While 
my experience there only lasted a couple of weeks, it reinforced both perceptions I had of 
Colombia. I saw beautiful, mountainous landscapes, a metropolitan city full of friendly 
and intelligent people and experienced great music, dancing, and food during my free 
time. I also saw terrible poverty, crime, and dirty, dangerous slums during my volunteer 
work. Trying to reconcile these opposing images, I spoke with the program coordinator, 
Monica Sepulveda, a Colombian citizen who had studied in the United States and had 
been involved in international volunteer work for several years. The program she worked 
for in Colombia was relatively new. She told me that she had been asked years before by 
the organization to begin a program in Bogotá, but said that she had refused for a long 
time, saying she had thought it was too dangerous to bring foreigners to her country. She 
began to tell me about the intense violence that Colombia had experienced during the 
80’s and 90’s while the government waged war against the powerful drug cartels. “We 
were like prisoners in our own country,” she said. However, my question as to how and 
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why Colombia, of all places, had developed such a history of drug violence was still 
unanswered, and this is what inspired my thesis research. 
 Of course, one can’t research drug violence in Colombia without finding Pablo 
Escobar’s name everywhere. I was surprised to find that the central idea behind nearly 
every mention of him was the contradictory perception of his character as an evil, 
ruthless, murdering criminal and simultaneously as a benevolent, charitable “Robin Hood” 
figure admired to this day. That became my thesis question. Looking to Colombian 
politics and society as the source, I wanted to figure out how Escobar could be seen at the 
same time as an infamous criminal to many and a legendary hero to others. 
 Pablo Escobar’s most famous personality traits were his extreme ruthlessness and 
his great generosity, as attributed to him by his enemies and admirers, respectively. Each 
of these traits has some evidence to support it. It is unclear exactly how many murders 
can be attributed to him because he employed numerous sicarios (assassins) to carry out 
his orders for him and was always careful to avoid anything that would directly link him 
to the crime. However, he and his associates were probably responsible for hundreds, if 
not thousands, of deaths, including police officers, journalists, and high-ranking officials 
and politicians. He also funded social programs and housing projects to benefit the poor, 
such as Barrio Pablo Escobar as it is called today, a neighborhood he had constructed in 
Medellín to house the poor living in the city’s dump that still has nearly 13,000 residents. 
There he is still remembered as a great man and referred to as “Don Pablo”. It was 
Semana magazine in 1983 that first described him as a “paisa Robin Hood,” praising his 
charity work. 
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The only thing he was more famous for than his crimes or charity was his 
incredible wealth. By his peak he had supposedly amassed a fortune greater than the 
national gross domestic product of some small countries. The cartel at one point is said to 
have controlled 80% of the global cocaine trade. Cash was flowing in faster than it could 
be spent or moved; Escobar was rumored to have written off 10% each year due to rats 
chewing on the piles of stored cash. However, wealth and the power it brought were not 
enough for Escobar. He became involved in politics and was elected as an alternate 
congressman before being kicked out of his party for his association with drug trafficking. 
He campaigned vehemently against and extradition agreement with the United States, 
using his wealth and threats to very successfully bribe and coerce politicians and judges. 
This was Escobar’s trademark strategy, plata o plomo (cash or lead). One either accepted 
his bribe or faced his sicarios. Eventually, when the Colombian government agreed to 
guarantee his protection from extradition, Escobar turned himself in and carried out his 
sentence in his own private prison. A little more than a year after entering the prison 
Escobar escaped, claiming the government had not upheld its side of the bargain. It 
would take the authorities another year and a half to finally catch up to him. In December 
of 1993 he was cornered in a house in Medellín and was shot and killed in the shootout 
while trying to escape on a rooftop. 
Since his death in 1993, Escobar’s legacy has inspired dozens of books and films, 
some aiming to show him as a monster, some defending him, and others capitalizing on 
the drama for entertainment, such as a Colombian TV series called Pablo Escobar: El 
patrón del mal that aired from 2009 to 2012. Today thousands visit his grave in Medellín 
	   5	  
each year. Some are tourists taking a popular “Pablo Escobar Tour,” some come to mourn 
or offer respect, and others come to curse him.  
 This thesis will analyze the origins and development of the social constructions of 
Escobar’s character, as seen by those who vilify him and by those who admire him. It 
does not aim to be an accurate representation of Escobar as a historical figure, but an 
exploration of the political and social conditions in Colombia that contributed to his 
success as a criminal and to the development of his different social constructions. It will 
examine the idea of social banditry and the outlaw hero as a framework for the creation 
of Escobar’s Robin Hood image as well as the history of such banditry in Colombia and 
its sociopolitical foundation. It will also discuss the foreign policy of the United States 
and its involvement in Colombia as it pertains to the criminal image of Escobar. 
Ultimately it will demonstrate how both constructions of Escobar, the Robin Hood and 
the Villain, are subjective products of Colombia’s history and politics. 
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PART I 
THE ROBIN HOOD ARCHETYPE 
 Perhaps the most famous outlaw of all time, Robin Hood of Sherwood Forest 
represents the standard model of the noble bandit. The details of the legend vary from 
source to source, but most of the important aspects of his character are always the same. 
He would have lived in medieval England and most versions of the story describe him as 
a commoner who defied the oppressive rule of corrupt authorities. After being declared 
an outlaw for illegally poaching the king’s deer, he took to the forest where he hid away 
from the Sheriff who would have him executed for treason. In the process he gained a 
group of followers known as his Merry Men who helped him make a living by robbing 
rich travelers as they passed through the forest, all the while successfully evading capture. 
The most famous aspect of his character was that he would distribute his loot among the 
poor, who formed his support base and aided him. He is always portrayed as being noble, 
fair and courteous, despite being labeled a criminal, as he adhered to a moral code that 
was seen as being more just than the law of the authorities. He represented one of the 
commoners who struck back against the immoral, rich elite that oppressed them. He was 
not depicted as a violent criminal to be feared, but a symbol of justice and integrity. In 
fact, it was the authorities of the king, especially the Sheriff, who upheld the law that 
were the villains of the legend. Pablo Escobar, the infamous Medellín drug lord, has been 
portrayed similarly. He was declared an outlaw by the state for capitalizing on the 
emerging global illegal drug trade and also gained the support and protection of the 
popular class who benefitted from his benevolence and generosity. In a nation where the 
popular class felt abandoned and exploited by their government, Escobar came to 
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represent the commoner who took advantage of the immorality of a wealthy, drug 
addicted society and corrupt politicians to redistribute wealth among the poor. 
 Robin Hood figures, like Escobar, are archetypes, purely social constructions. The 
same archetype can be found in figures all over the world among diverse cultures and 
time periods, such as the glorified outlaws of the American west like Jesse James and 
Billy the Kid, or the Mexican revolutionary leader turned folk hero Pancho Villa, who 
was also a personal hero of Pablo Escobar. The archetype has several descriptive titles 
such as outlaw hero, noble robber, and the social bandit that for the purposes of this thesis 
will be treated as the same. Eric Hobsbawm coined the term ‘social bandit’ in 1959 when 
he first published Primitive Rebels, which was the first study of such figures. He 
described social bandits as those individuals who engage in outlaw behavior as a form of 
social protest and are glorified as heroes among the people they represent, distinguishing 
them from those outlaws simply serving their own interests. "Hobsbawm argued that the 
social bandit is a reality that motivates certain forms of political resistance to oppressive 
regimes within peasant societies.”2 His thesis was controversial, since many historians 
and other scholars disagreed that the figure of the social bandit was based in reality, 
arguing that historical records tend not to support the details of the legends regarding 
most social bandits. However, the cultural phenomenon of outlaw hero myths certainly 
exists, whether or not the supposed social bandits would have actually measured up to 
their noble counterparts of legends. 
 Folklorist Graham Seal in 2008 wrote an article describing what he called “the 
Robin Hood principle,” which is a model of the way that real flesh and blood outlaws can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Graham Seal, "The Robin Hood principle: folklore, history, and the Social Bandit," Journal of Folklore 
Research 46.1 (2008) Literature Resources from Gale.	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come to be represented as heroes in folk stories and legends.3 He described a “series of 
identifiable cultural processes” that produce outlaw heroes as mythical constructions 
based on the similar representation of such figures in many different places, cultures and 
time periods. He argues that there is a “recurring framework” that produces legends when 
the appropriate conditions exist and twelve criteria that identify characteristics of outlaw 
heroes.  The outlaw hero is almost always found in cultures that perceive themselves as 
being oppressed or unfairly exploited by a more powerful, vilified group, whether a 
foreign authority or a corrupt regime. The figure of the outlaw hero, almost always male, 
usually shares several characteristics across different legends. He is usually forced to 
break the law or is somehow justified in doing so by oppressive unjust forces. He always 
holds support and sympathy from the social group that he represents. Legends also 
usually attribute him with some extraordinary skill or ability and tell of how he 
repeatedly outsmarts the authorities trying to capture him. Even the death of the outlaw 
hero is prescribed; he usually dies as the result of a betrayal and always dies defiantly. 
Very often the legends suggest that he may have escaped at the end. Finally and perhaps 
most importantly, he always follows a moral code, or is at least perceived to do so. This 
can include behavior such as righting wrongs, settling disputes, being polite and 
courteous, distributing wealth among the poor, and only killing when it is perceived as 
being justified. The outlaw hero cannot be seen by his support base as being ruthless or 
cruel and typically takes action to ensure his reputation is not tarnished. “Acting 
honorably is not only important for the image of the outlaw, it is also vitally important to 
ensure the support and sympathy of his social group… The need to be seen as having a 
just cause and to be pursuing it honorably is one reason why outlaw heroes are often 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ibid.  
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prolific communicators…”4 
 As Seal and others who have explored the topic have pointed out, the social 
construction of the outlaw hero is rarely an accurate historical representation of the actual 
individual.  Outlaws that meet some of the given criteria and that operate in places where 
the right social conditions exist can be transformed into heroic figures by the stories told 
by those who support them.  However, the outlaw hero absolutely must be seen as a 
friend of the poor.  Even if he does not actually go around sharing his loot with the 
commoners, he must at least not hurt or steal from them.  Beyond that, his social identity 
can be selectively constructed to fit the model. Some examples of cruelty or viciousness 
can be ignored and stories of the outlaw’s integrity or special talents may be exaggerated 
or even invented. 
 Folklorist, Kent L. Steckmesser, argued that the social constructions of outlaw 
heroes, specifically those of the American west, can become very distinct from their 
original character, transforming the individual into a figure of legend.5  Jesse James, for 
example, is an iconic figure of the American Wild West that became famous for robbing 
banks and trains. While the media of the time portrayed him as a violent and savage 
murderer, the “Robin Hood principle” worked to mold his identity to one befitting of an 
outlaw hero. As a former soldier for the Confederates during the Civil War, Jesse James’s 
crimes against rich bankers and businessmen would have been interpreted as a sort of 
social rebellion against the Yankees in the north, giving his actions a noble justification. 
According to the legend, James displayed such honorable characteristics as sharing his 
loot with the poor, although there is no evidence of this. “Assignment of the Robin Hood 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ibid. 
5 Kent L. Steckmesser, “Robin Hood and the American Outlaw: A Note on History and Folklore,” The 
Journal of American Folklore, Vol. 79, No. 312 (1966) JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/538043. 
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tag to any American outlaw implies such an idealized character profile, and outlaws who 
lack these ideal traits are excluded from the tradition.”6 In the social construction of an 
outlaw hero what matters most is not always the truth behind the historical figure, but 
what is believed to be true by those who perpetuate the legend. 
 
ESCOBAR AND THE ROBIN HOOD PRINCIPLE 
 Pablo Escobar, the infamous Colombian drug lord and leader of the Medellín cartel, 
also possesses the typical dual social identities of the modern Robin Hood figure.  In 
some interpretations he is seen as a supremely evil murderer and terrorist who killed 
without mercy. In others he is a benevolent, charitable and honorable man who cared for 
the poor of Colombia and was unjustly demonized by the imperialist United States and 
Colombian elites. It is probably impossible to make an accurate judgment of his character 
and motivations, but there are a few certain truths about his life and image. He was 
identified as a criminal by the DEA and the authorities in Washington and Bogotá but he 
also developed a significant support base among the Colombian popular class that 
defended him. Escobar was also unimaginably rich. He first appeared on the Forbes 
Billionaires List in 1987 with an estimated fortune of US$3 billion and he was featured in 
the next six issues as well until his death in 1993.7 He had the resources to finance 
anything he could imagine and this gave him enormous power.  
 Escobar himself was a master of constructing and marketing his social image and 
he took advantage of both sides of his perceived identity. On one hand, he encouraged his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ibid. 
7 Erin Carlyle, “Billionaire Drug Lords: El Chapo Guzman, Pablo Escobar, The Ochoa Brothers,” Forbes, 
March 13, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/erincarlyle/2012/03/13/billionaire-druglords-el-chapo-
guzman-pablo-escobar-the-ochoa-brothers/. 
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reputation as a ruthless bandido (bandit, outlaw) to gain power and intimidate his 
business and political rivals. He developed this reputation from a young age by 
kidnapping and killing hostages for ransom or murdering those who stood in the way of 
his success. He became so feared for his power and mercilessness that he was able to 
effectively intimidate even the highest-ranking politicians, officials and judges into 
cooperation. 
 At the same time he portrayed himself to the public as a gentle and humble friend 
of the poor in order to strengthen his public support base and to demonize those who 
would demonize him. He is still loved and admired for his generosity among the lower 
class of his home city of Medellín, Colombia where he constructed entire neighborhoods 
to house the poor and was known to walk through the slums of the city handing out cash 
to its inhabitants.8 While there are many who say this was all an act designed to 
manipulate the masses into supporting him for his own benefit, many of his surviving 
family members and close associates also speak of him as a soft spoken and polite man, a 
loving father, and a faithful Christian whose altruism was very genuine. Some of 
Escobar’s supporters claim he was a scapegoat of the imperialist U.S. and corrupt 
Colombian governments. 
 If one uses Graham Seal’s criteria of outlaw hero legends outlined above, Escobar’s 
Robin Hood persona fits nearly perfectly, at least based on what his supporters believe to 
be true. This interpretation tends to leave out or deny the hundreds of murders attributed 
to Escobar, focusing instead on his generosity and supposedly honorable nature. He rose 
to fame by trafficking drugs, a form of banditry. Some might argue that he was in a sense 
forced to do so by the unjust distribution of wealth and opportunity, imposed by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Mark Bowden, Killing Pablo (New York: Penguin Books, 2002), 31. 
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wealthy elite. He was known for enforcing his own sort of social justice and righting 
perceived wrongs as well as being fair in his business dealings. He shared with the poor 
and regularly outsmarted or otherwise escaped the authorities. He died defiantly in a 
shoot out, as is fitting for outlaw heroes, and is rumored to have escaped or taken his own 
life at the last minute, robbing his enemies of the satisfaction of killing him. 
 Using the same criteria to judge Escobar based on the construction presented by his 
enemies, the noble bandit image falls apart. Like Robin Hood was to the Sheriff, Escobar 
was seen as simply another dangerous thug, however he became an exceptionally 
powerful one and would take his fight against authority to another level. He was cruel 
and merciless, murdering dozens if not hundreds of people himself and ordering the 
deaths of countless others, including Supreme Court judges, Presidential candidates, 
journalists, and police officers. His charitable work was just a front to disguise his true 
criminal nature and the unprecedented violence he unleashed caused more harm to the 
poor than his generosity did them good. In this interpretation, the moral code of the 
outlaw hero is nowhere to be found. 
 There are aspects of both constructions of Escobar that are undeniably true and 
others that may be influenced by bias or exaggeration. There is not necessarily one right 
or wrong construction, or one that is decidedly more accurate than another. What is clear 
is that each construction of his character was influenced by the social, economic, political 
and cultural context from which it emerged. Medellín’s history and the expansion of 
urban poverty influenced the image of Escobar was that held by the Antioqueño masses, 
while the elites in the Colombian government saw a different picture influenced by the 
image exported by Washington and its intelligence agencies. 
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 Escobar’s life and personal development as well as his social construction as Robin 
Hood can be explained, at least in part, by the social and political conditions in Colombia 
during his lifetime and decades before his birth. Escobar’s own inherent personality can 
account for the rest. Escobar the man and Escobar the myth are both products of 
Colombia’s violent and troubled history. During the 1930’s and 40’s, political and social 
tensions mounted until they erupted into a period widespread partisan conflict, chaos and 
banditry referred to simply as la Violencia. Successive repressive administrations did 
little to restore balance and the violence continued for decades, mostly in rural areas 
outside the central government’s control. It displaced thousands of peasants, who 
migrated from the countryside into urban centers like Medellín, creating pockets of 
poverty within the city and expanding outward into slums. 
 Political stability was restored in 1958 when Liberal and Conservative leaders 
established the National Front and agreed to share the presidency by alternating each 
term for a sixteen-year period.9 In 1961, President Kennedy initiated a program called 
Alliance for Progress, aimed to establish a cooperative relationship with Latin American 
nations to promote economic liberalization and capitalism and discourage any communist 
ideologies.10 Colombia under the National Front would be one of the Alliance’s greatest 
examples of success in the region and in the late 1960’s the economy was growing by 
around 6% annually. Despite the country’s economic growth, the popular class saw little 
improvement in their conditions. The gap between rich and poor widened even further. In 
1970, the poorest half of the urban population earned less than 16% of total urban income, 
while the richest 10% earned over 43%. In the countryside nearly two thirds of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 David Bushnell, The Making of Modern Colombia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 224. 
10 Ibid., 231. 
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Colombians lived in “absolute poverty.”11 Most of the country’s land and wealth was 
held by a small percentage of the population and the large migration away from rural 
farms into cities created a large supply of labor relative to demand, which kept wages and 
overall employment low. Throughout the 1970’s the urban poor organized strikes and 
demonstrations demanding improved public services or supporting land and agrarian 
reform.12 Fearing leftist agitation in the popular class, the military repressed the strikes, 
resulting in an unknown number of deaths and the regime’s popularity plummeting.13 In 
line with the United States’ strong position against communism, the National Front 
administrations also pursued policies of strict political repression, especially of leftist 
political organizations that were beginning to emerge at the time.14 
 Escobar, born in 1949, was a child of la Violencia and grew up during the worst 
years. By the time he was an adult the violence had calmed, but it had created a 
generation of Colombians who were accustomed to violence and murder. Many of them, 
especially the lower classes, felt alienated and distrustful of the government that they saw 
as corrupt and unjust. This created the appropriate conditions for a Robin Hood figure to 
emerge, someone to steal from the rich and redistribute the wealth and power among the 
poor. Escobar did just that, except he did it on a global scale by funneling billions dollars 
away from wealthy American consumers and into to Colombia. Then the end of the Cold 
War in the 1980’s caused a dramatic shift in the United States’ policy towards Latin 
America. When the threat of communism began to fade away, it was replaced by the 
threat of drugs and drug traffickers. Being the most powerful drug trafficker alive, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ibid., 241; See Appendix II: Poverty in Antioquia, 2006. 
12 Marcos Palacios, Between Legitimacy and Violence: A History of Colombia, 1875-2002, trans. Richard 
Stoller (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 196. 
13 Ibid., 197. 
14 Ibid., 190. 
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Escobar became the natural enemy of the United States. What ensued was one of the 
most dramatic and bloody games of cops and robbers ever played, as the world’s most 
powerful outlaw faced off against the world’s most powerful sheriff.  
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PART II 
ESCOBAR, A PRODUCT OF LA VIOLENCIA 
 
 Colombia has a long history of internal political instability and violence as well as 
a deeply rooted outlaw tradition. Its geographic features have always presented a 
challenge for central governance; rough mountainous terrain and inhospitable jungles 
have predisposed the nation to regional isolation and made transportation, 
communication and law enforcement especially difficult. Additionally, Colombia serves 
as a bridge between South and Central America and has access to both the Pacific and 
Atlantic oceans. Its geographic location combined with a historically weak central 
government and little law enforcement in remote areas has also predisposed it to criminal 
activities, including banditry and contraband smuggling. 
Wealthy landowners in the countryside, unable to rely on the state for justice, 
would hire private armies to protect their property. In rural areas especially, laws were 
made by the elites and enforced by their paramilitaries. The concept of taking the law into 
one’s own hands to protect one’s self and deal out justice has been a trend throughout 
Colombia’s history. However, simple thieves and smugglers only accounted for a fraction 
of the violent conflict in Colombia. It is the nation’s centuries old problem of internal 
political conflict, pitting Liberals against Conservatives, that has created a long lasting 
atmosphere of instability and violence. 
Throughout the 1900’s Colombia’s population was divided by party affiliation. 
Party loyalties were almost always inherited; young children were indoctrinated as either 
Liberals or Conservatives by their families and neighbors and often were taught to hate 
the other party. In fact, at the turn of the century the nation was fighting the Thousand 
	   17	  
Days’ War, a bloody civil conflict between the two parties that engulfed the entire 
country and resulted the Conservative party’s dominance for decades. When the next 
Liberal president was elected in 1930, Liberals in the countryside took the opportunity to 
avenge old grudges against local Conservatives, and some Conservatives rejected the new 
president, inciting outbreaks of violence in many rural areas.15 Similar outbreaks of 
fighting are all too familiar in Colombian history though. Strong tension between the 
parties, especially in rural areas, was the norm and even small disturbances could easily 
cause it to boil over into armed conflict.  Successive administrations, all of them Liberal 
until 1946, had to contend with continuous outbreaks of violence in the countryside, 
although the scale of these conflicts were minor compared to what would follow. Often 
the violence was politically motivated but frequently resembled simple banditry.  
During the 1930’s and 40’s, a Liberal politician named Jorge Eliecer Gaitán was 
gaining significant popular support. He had first become popular in the 1920’s for 
defending workers’ rights and speaking out against the oligarchic nature of Colombian 
politics. He came to be seen as the voice of the common people, a “hero of the 
peasants.”16 He ran for president in 1946 but lost due to a split in the Liberal party that 
resulted in two Liberal candidates running, allowing Conservative President Mariano 
Ospina Pérez to be elected. However he then assumed leadership of the reunited Liberal 
party and was expected by many to win the 1950 election.	  
Later, in 1953, Miguel Jorrín wrote in Governments of Latin America that “the 
antecedent… of the grave political problems facing Colombia may be found in the 
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16 John D. Martz, Colombia: A Contemporary Political Survey (Durham: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1962), 43. 
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Presidential elections held on May 5th 1946.”17 The years of partisan tension and disputes 
within the parties themselves had resulted in this political imbalance that would lead to a 
dramatic escalation in the conflict that was already widespread the Colombian 
countryside. The election year of 1946 is often marked as the starting point of one of the 
darkest moments in Colombian history, “a nightmarish period of bloodletting so empty of 
meaning it is simply called la Violencia.”18 The unprecedented levels of brutal violent 
conflict have defied clear explanation, despite numerous investigations into its nature and 
causes. There were elements of partisan hatred, class conflict and political rebellion but 
just as much apparently senseless rape, torture and murder. One estimate indicates that 
around 200,000 Colombians were killed and that at least 20% of the population was 
directly affected between 1946 and 1966, including those who were injured or forced to 
flee their homes.19 The typical response from the government was forceful repression, 
which did more to fuel the conflict than to reduce it, especially in its political dimension: 
Not only did the victorious Conservatives indulge in attacks on Liberals, but in 
many areas the Liberals… refused to accept the legally elected although minority 
Conservative president and resorted to armed resistance… In reply the 
Conservatives began to politicize the police and the armed forces… using the 
forces of public order as partisan political instruments… Liberals began to form 
organized guerrilla bands to harass the authorities… the Conservatives in turn 
strengthened their hold on the police and the army and began the formation 
counter-guerilla of bands made up of fanatical Conservative peasants, whipped to 
a religious frenzy.20 
 
Liberals, including most of the popular class, saw Gaitán as their only hope to end 
the persecution and violence. On April 9th, 1948, while the city of Bogotá was preparing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Ibid., 33. 
18 Bowden, 11. 
19 Norman A. Bailey, “La Violencia in Colombia,” Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. 9, No. 4 (1967) 
JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/164860. 
20 Ibid. 
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to host the 9th International Conference of American States, Gaitán was leaving his office 
to go to lunch, but he was shot and killed as he stepped onto the street.21 
His assassination unleashed a wave of violence known as el Bogotazo that would 
change the course of Colombian history.  His murderer was a young man named Juan 
Roa Sierra whose motivations remain unclear, although the immediate conclusion of the 
onlookers was that he was part of a plot designed by the Conservatives. The onlookers 
transformed into a violent mob, killing Roa and burning, looting and destroying the city. 
The violence carried on into the night and when the dust finally settled the city was 
trashed and hundreds, maybe even thousands, were dead. Unfortunately, even after the 
conflict died down in the capital, the violence it initiated had spread to other cities and 
throughout the countryside. Often the chaotic violence seemed meaningless. “The 
government fought paramilitaries and guerrillas, industrialists fought unionists, 
conservative Catholics fought heretical liberals, and bandidos took advantage of the free-
for-all to plunder. Gaitán’s death had unleashed demons that had less to do with the 
emerging modern world than with Colombia’s deeply troubled past.”22 
 In the next election, a Conservative Laureano Gómez ran uncontested and used the 
powers granted to him under the state of siege to establish a civilian dictatorship. During 
his term levels of violence increased, which he combated with authoritarian repression by 
labeling all forms of political protest “banditry.”23 In 1953, a coup-d’etat transferred 
power to General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, who was successful at first in reducing the 
political violence, but high levels of banditry persisted:  
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When Rojas Pinilla came to power in 1953, he declared a general amnesty for all 
guerrillas who surrendered to government forces with their arms. Thousands of 
guerrillas did so, and between 1953 and 1955 la Violencia gradually changed 
character, transforming itself largely from political to economic in motivation and 
from guerrilla to bandit in character.24 
 
Through kidnapping for ransom, extortion of wealthy rural landowners, and stealing 
crops or demanding a percentage of their proceeds these non-political bandits took 
advantage of the disorganized government and law enforcement for their own economic 
benefit. 
Eventually, in a desperate effort to regain control of the country and its people, 
Liberal and Conservative leaders came together and formed National Front in 1958.25 
They agreed upon a system of sharing the presidency by alternating parties for a 16-year 
period.  While this effectively stabilized the central government and reduced partisan 
violence, it did little to expand democratization to other political groups. During this time, 
there was still persistent armed conflict in rural regions. Leftist guerrilla organizations, 
such as the FARC and ELN among others, became active and began to challenge the 
oligarchic political system and demand political representation and legitimacy. The 
administrations of the National Front were harshly repressive of such leftist political 
movements that threatened the delicate stability that had not been present for decades. 
Although the violence did decrease in most places, Colombia was still deeply divided. 
These anarchic and violent conditions were the backdrop to the society in which 
Escobar and others in his generation would grow up. The popular classes had suffered 
years of unprecedented violence and terror. Thousands of rural poor had been displaced 
and forced to migrate to urban centers, where they congregated in slums. They resented 	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and distrusted the government that had seemingly done more to hurt them than to help 
them and failed to provide for them after all they had suffered. These people who felt 
forsaken and powerless and were accustomed to violence were the same who would find 
a hero in Escobar, the man who not only came from nothing and achieved wealth but who 
also gave it back to them. The urban poor would place the responsibilities of the state in 
the hands of Escobar and welcomed the paternalistic role he played. 
 
A HISTORY OF BANDIDOS 
This chaotic environment, marked by violent conflict, political instability, and 
nonexistent or politically affiliated law enforcement had a long lasting effect on 
Colombian society. The citizens and peasantry harbored a deep distrust for the 
government and its institutions.  Some of the bandidos who traveled the country stealing 
and murdering became famous; not feared for their brutality, but admired as rebels 
against the corrupt system. Many claimed a political motive, carrying out revenge against 
Liberals or Conservatives and enjoying support from the members of whichever party 
they affiliated themselves with. Where they operated with support from the peasants or 
even local leaders they were usually referred to as guerrillas, implying their struggle for a 
cause. The term bandit was used by the Conservative government and, later under Rojas, 
by the army.26 
Stories of their exploits became legendary and “their crimes were seem by many 
common people as blows stuck against power.”27 They became, in a way, icons of 
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resistance to the powerless poor, morphing into vaguely Robin Hood-like figures, 
exacting revenge as they terrorized, murdered and stole from wealthy landowners and 
political enemies. Their names, titles like Desquite, Tirofijo, Sangrenegra, and Chispas, 
were well known across the nation. Even before la Violencia, outlaws were popular icons, 
such as José del Carmen Tejeiro, a bandido of the Thousand Day’s War, who “would not 
just steal from wealthy landowning enemies; he would punish and humiliate them, 
forcing them to sign declarations such as “I was whipped fifty times by José del Carmen 
Tejeiro as retribution for persecuting him.”28 Despite their reputation for cruelty, many of 
the common people rooted for these outlaws as much as they feared them. They became 
romanticized, not unlike some American outlaws such as Jesse James or Bonnie and 
Clyde. With the bandidos, “terror became art, a form of psychological warfare with a 
quasi-religious aesthetic.”29  Torture and mutilation were commonplace, and many 
criminals had their own gruesome signatures.  Body parts and mutilated corpses were 
often displayed for the rest of the world to see. “The joke Colombians told was that God 
had made their land so beautiful, so rich in every natural way, that it was unfair to the rest 
of the world; He had evened the score by populating it with the most evil race of men.”30 
Unlike the social bandit in the classic sense, these bandidos did not actively promote a 
positive image of themselves among their peasant bases. “The bloody ambience and 
terror of the Violencia, on the contrary, did not lend itself to this type of romantic 
frivolity... Acts of violent terrorism were justified as righteous vengeance against 
representatives of the opposing party…”31 Even when many of them came to see 
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themselves as defenders of their people, they did not try to hide or diminish their 
reputations for cruelty to foster an honorable image. Instead, it was their notoriety for 
violence that perpetuated the development of the popular myths. 
Efraín González, also known as “El Siete Colores” (Seven Colors), was a 
Conservative bandido who was supposedly responsible for 128 murders. One of his 
legendary skills was the ability to turn himself into a black cat to elude the authorities. 
When he was a child he moved to Quindío after his mother was killed by liberal 
guerrillas, justifying his lifelong hatred for the party. He was known for being a devoted 
Catholic, a point regularly expressed in the press, and was said to dress as a priest when 
committing his worst crimes. A senator who defended him in Congress once referred to 
him as the Robin Hood of Boyacá, where he was asked to help defend the emerald mines 
and the peasants. In 1965 he was finally killed on a rooftop in Bogotá by a force of 200 
soldiers sent to capture him. After his death crowds of people came to the house where he 
was shot to publicly demonstrate support for him, placing a small alter adorned with a 
cross and image of the Virgin in front of the doorway.32 
Teófilo Rojas, also known by his alias “Chispas,” was a Liberal bandido and a 
natural enemy of Efraín González. As the story goes, he joined a group of liberal 
guerrillas when he was twelve years old after witnessing the murder of his relatives and 
neighbors at the hands of the chulavitas, the Conservative political police under the 
Ospina Pérez’s administration. He stood out for his charisma and bravery and was given 
important missions, despite his young age. He and the other liberal guerrillas accepted the 
amnesty offer put forward by the Rojas regime, but was forced back into fighting when 
peasants in Quindío came to request his protection from the chulavitas, then under 	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command of Seargant Oliverio Moya Lagos. Chispas and his men destroyed the police 
force that had been terrorizing the peasants. In 1958, he again expressed the desire to be 
pardoned and to return to his farming life, but the government was slow to grant him 
amnesty. The next year the peasants of Quindío called to him for help again, this time for 
protection from conservative bandidos, including Efraín González. Quindío was overrun 
with bloodshed as the liberal and conservative gangs clashed against one another. Finally, 
in January of 1962 as a result of a push from the government to end banditry and violence, 
Chispas was killed by the army.33 
Like González and Chispas, there were hundreds of other local and regional 
Robin Hoods throughout Colombia, especially in the more remote regions where the 
violence was the worst. Medardo Trejos Ladino, alias Capitán Venganza (Captain 
Revenge), operated in the municipality of Quinchía, in Risaralda. His liberal gang 
prohibited any police from entering his zone of control and fought against the chulavitas, 
with the intention of eliminating all conservatives from the region.34 Jacinto Cruz Usma, 
alias Sangrenegra (Blackblood), was known for his gruesome signature, the “corte de 
flanela,” which consisted of slitting the victim’s throat and pulling the tongue out through 
the opening.35 Most bandidos were eventually killed or captured by the army, but a few 
continued and became leaders of leftist guerrilla groups, such as Pedro Antonio Marín, 
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aliases Manuel Marulanda Vélez and Tirofijo (Sureshot) who was the commander of the 
FARC until his death in 2008.36 
Press censorship at the time prevented the news from reporting all of the details; 
most of the stories about the bandidos were compiled years later based oral tradition and 
some official reports, both of which would be biased towards one representation or 
another. Like the original Robin Hood legend, the popular identities of these bandidos are 
constructions based on subjective interpretations that turn reality into something that is 
probably closer to myth. Escobar admired the famous bandidos he grew up hearing 
stories about and began to emulate them. His figure represents a more contemporary 
version of the bandido, urban and capitalist but still stemming from the same culture of 
violence. 
 
MEDELLÍN AND THE BEGINNING OF THE DRUG TRADE IN COLOMBIA 
In colonial times, Medellín was Colombia’s mining center. The people called 
themselves paisas. Being isolated by geography, they developed a distinct culture, as 
well as a tradition of smuggling. “Outwardly modest, they were an aggressive, ambitious 
people, hard workers with hard heads who coveted money and social position.”37  
Colonists from Bogotá found the paisas to be backwards and crude, mostly 
contrabandistas, mocking their strange accents and looking down at their lack of 
sophistication.  However, by Escobar’s time, Medellín had developed into an attractive, 
modern city and the paisas were creative, cunning businessmen.  Raised to be ambitions, 
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sons were encouraged to become independent and wealthy. “’If you succeed, send 
money,’ went an old paisa saying. ‘If you fail, don’t come home’”.38   
In the 1970’s, Medellín was already home to organized crime syndicates that 
made their money smuggling various kinds of contraband, including narcotics.  
Marijuana had been around for some time, but cocaine had not been especially common 
in Colombia.  Before 1973, most cocaine was produced in Chile, using coca leaves from 
Peru and Bolivia, and Colombian smugglers were the link to the United States.  While the 
Chileans profited nicely, the market for cocaine was still not very big, so the industry 
remained small.  However, in 1973, when General Augusto Pinochet took control of 
Chile, he effectively ended the cocaine business there.39 The Colombians took over the 
trade at just the right time.  They had the same easy access to coca leaves from Peru and 
Bolivia, little trouble from law enforcement, and they already had established smuggling 
routes used to transport marijuana.  Cocaine, however, was even easier to move because 
it was less bulky, less smelly and turned a higher profit.  
The logistics of cocaine trafficking were already in place when the drug started to 
become very popular in the United States.  Suddenly, in the late 1970’s, cocaine was 
fashionable.  It was the drug of choice for young, hip party-goers, and it was everywhere.  
Demand for the drug exploded, and the Colombians were in the perfect position to fill 
that order. The Colombian drug traffickers had little to worry about from the authorities 
who could be easily bribed. In urban centers like Medellín, the popular class 
neighborhoods had expanded and the city was full of reckless, low class Colombian 
youth, like Pablo Escobar, who had few opportunities and were looking for a path to 	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success.40 Medellín had higher rates of unemployment than Bogotá and Cali, especially 
among the youth who were often recruited to work as drug smugglers or sicarios for the 
expanding drug cartels.41  
 
PABLO ESCOBAR’S EARLY LIFE 
 Escobar was born December 1, 1949 in a rural town called Rionegro.  His mother, 
Hermilda, was a schoolteacher, and his father Abel farmed.  Although later he would 
depict his upbringing as poor and humble, by Colombian standards at the time his family 
was comfortably middle-class and Liberal. However, la Violencia was never far from 
their lives. Alonso Salazar, author of La Parábola de Pablo, recounts an event that shows 
just how close Escobar’s childhood was to the terror of la Violencia. His mother, 
Hermilda had moved their family to a tiny village in Titiribí, a municipality of Antioquia, 
to teach at a school there. However, the conservatives of the town were enraged at the 
thought of a Liberal woman indoctrinating their children with her ideologies. They 
attacked in the night and tried to burn down the small schoolhouse where the family had 
barren the doors taken shelter. Hermilda prayed to Niño Jesús de Atocha for protection, 
and miraculously the mob outside was unable to penetrate or set fire to the building. The 
army arrived in the early hours to disperse the mob and the morning showed the 
devastation left behind: 
Upon stepping outside they saw something that they would never forget: liberal 
peasants hung by their feet from the school’s crossbeams and decapitated with a 
machete. The blood, dark and thick, covered the hallway and stuck to their feet. 
The army recommended they flee immediately, without even gathering their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 See Appendix III: Socioeconomic Strata in Medellín, 1997. 
41 Chistopher Abel, “Colombia and the Drug Barons: Conflict and Containment,” The World Today, Vol. 
49, No. 5 (May, 1993) JSTOR, http://www.jstor.com/stable/40396505; In 1992, unemployment in Medellín 
was at 12.1%, compared to 9% and 7.3% in Cali and Bogotá, respectively. 
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clothes, and escorted them some two hours until they arrived at the town, from 
where they continued alone on the way to the train that would carry them back to 
Medellín.42 
 
They moved to Envigado, a suburb of Medellín. Hermilda promised to build a chapel 
devoted to el Niño de Atocha that Escobar would have constructed for her. 
 Growing up, Escobar was not too different from his classmates. He liked soccer 
and fast food and popular music, but his charisma and ambition set him apart from his 
peers. Hermilda said that as a young child he always told her that he “[wanted] to be 
big.”43 He reportedly swore to his friends that if he did not have a million pesos by the 
time he was thirty he would kill himself. He did well in school with little difficulty and at 
age thirteen he was elected president of his school’s Council for Student Wellness, where 
he fought for support for transportation and food for poor students. At the same time, he 
was introduced to revolutionary leftist ideologies. “He learned a series of anti-imperialist 
and anti-oligarchic phrases that he would repeat for the rest of his life… He wanted to be 
leftist but rich.”44  
 He had a vain streak too. He took to carrying a comb in his pocket and was known 
to check his reflection in windows as he passed by.45 Later, after amassing his fortunes, 
he liked have his picture taken dressed up as the famous gangsters and bandidos that he 
idolized, like Pancho Villa and Al Capone.46 “He wanted to be a bandido,” said one of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Alonso Salazar, Pablo Escobar, el patron del mal (Doral: Santillana, 2012), 42-43. Quote translated here 
by writer. 
43 Bowden, 17. 
44 Salazar, 35, translated here by writer. 
45 Ibid., 36. 
46 See Appendix VII: Photograph. 
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his associates, Popeye, for the documentary, Pablo Escobar: Angel o demonio, “he told 
me, ‘I was everything I wanted to be, a bandido.’”47 
Escobar’s maternal grandfather, Roberto Gaviria, became the mayor of his town, 
but before that even he was a contrabandista (smuggler). Hermilda would proudly tell 
stories about how he so intelligently outsmarted the authorities. He would travel all the 
way to Urabá, near the border with Panamá, to buy whiskey. He would carry the whiskey 
back in a coffin accompanied by four men and women dressed in black posing as 
mourners. They would bury the coffin in the cemetery, then return at night to collect their 
cargo. One day, someone alerted Roberto that someone had told the authorities about his 
scheme. However, he went out as usual and brought back his coffin. During the fake 
burial ceremony, they arrived to arrest him for smuggling contraband, but Roberto denied 
any wrongdoing. When they opened the coffin they found it was full of rocks and 
determined that he was no contrabandista, just a crazy old man.48  
As a teenager, Escobar developed a marijuana habit that he would continue for the 
rest of his life.  He would sleep in until the early afternoon and spend most of the day and 
night stoned. He was always chubby and smoking weed and eating junk food kept him 
that way.  “He looked out at the world through big, heavy-lidded hazel eyes and 
cultivated the bemused boredom of the chronic doper.”49 He starting hanging out in bars 
at night in the rougher parts of town with his cousin Gustavo Gaviria and committing 
petty street crimes for cash and for fun.  “His turn to crime appears to have been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Popeye [pseudo.], Pablo Escobar, ángel o demonio, Directed by Jorge Granier (2007; Cineplex, 2011), 
Web. Statement translated here by writer. 
48 Salazar, 37. 
49 Bowden, 17. 
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motivated as much by ennui as ambition.”50 Escobar was just another hoodlum chasing 
the ‘paisa dream’ of wealth and social position, but preferring illegal methods over hard 
work.  What set him apart was his ambition and ruthlessness.  He began running street 
scams, selling contraband cigarettes and fake lottery tickets. He was quite successful and 
he became well known for his confidence and recklessness. 
He was exceptionally daring. Maybe it was the dope, but Pablo discovered in 
himself an ability to remain calm, deliberate, even cheerful when others grew 
frightened and unsteady… On several occasions as a youth, Pablo later boasted, 
he had help up Medellín banks by himself with an automatic rifle, bantering 
cheerfully with the clerks… That kind of recklessness and poise is what 
distinguished Pablo from this criminal peers and made him their leader.51 
 
He expanded his criminal activity into stealing cars, sometimes in broad daylight 
by pulling the driver out of the stopped vehicle, and selling it for parts.  He and his gang 
could quickly turn a profit without leaving any evidence of a crime.  Soon Escobar could 
bribe municipal officials for new documents for the stolen cars and simply resell them 
whole.  He even found a way to make money off cars he didn’t steal, by selling 
protection from his own car thieves, demonstrating and effective but shrewd knack for 
generating income.52 
Soon he would move on to bigger crimes, including kidnapping, murder, and drug 
trafficking. His business grew too, until he was raking in such enormous profits that he 
could afford literally anything that money could buy, including loyalty. Escobar’s 
lifestyle, as well as that of many of the other successful drug traffickers, was 
unbelievably extravagant. He built an estate on a 7400 acre ranch he called Hacienda Los 
Nápoles where he had his own private airport, among other luxuries. He imported 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Ibid., 18. 
51 Ibid., 19. 
52 Ibid., 20. 
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hundreds of exotic animals like lions, elephants and buffaloes. Among his collection of 
outlaw memorabilia was the car full of bullet holes that he claimed once belonged to 
Bonnie and Clyde.53 He would entertain his friends by playing on his own soccer field or 
hiring beautiful women to participate in erotic, often bizarre, games.54 Whatever he 
couldn’t buy with cash, he got with threats. His cold-blooded reputation and power 
preceded him; no one took his threats lightly. What Escobar wanted, He got one way or 
another. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 “In Medellín, walls do not a prison make: Pablo Escobar, the world's most wanted man,” The 
Independent, August 8, 1992. http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/profile-in-medellin-walls-do-not-a-
prison-make-pablo-escobar-the-worlds-most-wanted-man-1539076.html. 
54 Bowden, 26. 
	   32	  
PART III 
DEVELOPMENT OF ESCOBAR’S CRIMINAL AND BUSINESS PERSONA 
As Escobar began to develop as a criminal and businessman, he needed to be sure 
that he was respected and feared. All of his rivals and associates needed to know that he 
was powerful and capable of anything, not someone to be messed with or scoffed at.  He 
began to develop and encourage his reputation for ruthlessness and violence.  Kidnapping 
for ransom was his primary method of debt collection for anyone who thought they did 
not need to take him seriously. He would recruit people to carry out the kidnappings for 
him, always sure to keep some level of anonymity so that the crimes couldn’t be directly 
traced back to him. If he was not paid the money he was owed, he did not hesitate to have 
the victim killed. “Sometimes the victim was killed after the ransom was paid, just to 
make a point.”55 Ordering people to carry out murders never seemed to affect Escobar’s 
conscience. It was just part of the business and he became very good at using it to his 
advantage.  
In 1971, still early in his development, Escobar demonstrated another facet to his 
criminal persona that would become vital to his career; that was an aptitude for 
influencing his public image by enforcing his own sort of social justice. Diego Echavarría 
was a wealthy Conservative factory owner in Envigado. He was strongly disliked by 
many of the lower class workers, who were being laid off and evicted from their homes 
as men like Echavarría were expanding their property holdings. That summer, he was 
kidnapped and held for US$50,000 ransom, which his family paid. However, his body 
was found weeks later in a hole in the ground, not far from where Escobar lived at the 
time. Although there was no direct evidence linking Escobar to the crime, it was widely 	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attributed to him and he made no effort to deny his involvement. The poor workers, now 
living in the slums after being stripped of their homes, began to refer admiringly to 
Escobar as “El Doctor,” and he became a sort of local legend. From the beginning, 
Escobar had a gift for getting the public on his side. He liked to see himself as “a 
people’s don,” a respectable and admirable figure, despite what his business activity 
would suggest.56 
The transition to drug trafficking was only natural for someone in Escobar’s 
position. In 1976, Escobar was arrested with his cousin Gustavo crossing the border from 
Ecuador with thirty-nine pounds of cocaine after someone had supposedly tipped off the 
DAS (Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad). Escobar had been arrested before and 
served short prison terms, but this was a much more serious charge. The judge appointed 
to his case was Mariela Espinosa. When she refused Escobar’s bribes, a little background 
research revealed that the judge had a strained relationship with his brother who was a 
lawyer. Escobar hired the brother to represent him, correctly predicting that the judge 
would step down from his case. The new judge proved more easily swayed by bribes and 
Escobar and the others were freed. While an appellate judge tried to have Escobar 
rearrested and tried in a fair court, the process was delayed by appeals, and within a year 
the two DAS agents that had arrested him were found murdered. “Pablo was establishing 
a pattern of dealing with the authorities that would become his trademark. It soon became 
knows simply as plata o plomo. One either accepted Escobar’s plata or his plomo.”57 He 
did not forget Mariela Espinosa either. Although he did not have her assassinated, he 
condemned her to traveling on foot for the rest of her life; whenever she bought a new car, 	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it was stolen, pushed off a cliff, or burnt.58 The strategy proved to be very effective since 
it was so well enforced. Years later, when Escobar had declared all out war on the 
government in his campaign to force the outlawing of extradition, he had killed so many 
judges and their family members that new judges would refuse to take his cases. Charges 
would be immediately dropped or files on his cases would disappear as judges and police 
chiefs tried to stay out of his crosshairs. 
As his drug trafficking business expanded, his profits went through the roof. 
Escobar was able to buy control of the business from growers and processors and pay for 
protection.  Few law enforcement officials were eager to resist, considering their two 
options were typically to profit from bribes or to be murdered. Escobar even allowed 
small shipments to be intercepted, provided the majority got through, to make it look like 
the law enforcement was doing its job and to avoid suspicion.  The profits more than 
made up for the losses.  “Between 1976 and 1980 bank deposits in Colombia’s four major 
cities more than doubled.  So many illegal American dollars were flooding the country 
that the country’s elite began looking for ways to score its share without breaking the law. 
President Alfonso López Michelsen’s administration permitted a practice… which 
allowed unlimited quantities of dollars to be converted to Colombian pesos… The 
government played along by turning a blind eye.”59 
The money attracted attention from others looking to profit from their success. On 
November 13, 1981, Jorge Luis Ochoa told Escobar that his sister, Marta Nieves had 
been kidnapped. The Ochoa family, with the other brothers Fabio and Juan David and 
their father Fabio Ochoa Restrepo, was highly respected and a long-time partner in the 	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drug business. She was being held ransom for twelve million dollars by the M-19, a 
leftist guerrilla group. Escobar had already established a relationship with some members 
of the group and took their action against his business partners as a personal offense, one 
that he would not stand for. He held a meeting at Hacienda Nápoles attended by 200 drug 
traffickers from across the country, including his associate Carlos Lehder who had once 
escaped a kidnapping attempt from the same guerrilla group. They announced the 
formation of their own paramilitary organization, Muerte a Secuestradores (Death to 
Kidnappers), by dropping leaflets from airplanes over soccer stadiums that promised 
retaliation and included photos of M-19’s leaders, although Escobar and many others 
remained anonymous. They gathered a thousand men to work in collaboration with police 
and military forces to hunt down the M-19 and within a couple months had killed 400 
guerrillas as well as their friends and family members. After the total assault on the 
organization Marta Nieves was released February 16, 1982. With her release, MAS freed 
twenty guerrillas they still held captive and paid the M-19 more than one million 
dollars.60 Escobar had demonstrated just how powerful he was and re-established a 
relationship with the organization where he was dominant. Additionally, in the eyes of 
some Colombians, fighting the leftist guerrillas legitimized the drug traffickers.61 At the 
time the guerrillas seemed like a larger threat than the narcos who in a way defended the 
social order. After all, the vast majority of cocaine was being consumed in the United 
States; Colombians were only seeing the profits. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Salazar, 81-7. 
61 Bowden, 33. 
	   36	  
DEVELOPMENT OF ROBIN HOOD IMAGE AND POLITICAL CAREER 
 Escobar became a popular local figure after the death of Echavarría, but the 
creation of his social image, especially among the poorest citizens, was just getting 
started. In 1976, shortly before his first cocaine bust, he married María Victoria Henao, 
much to the dismay of her family since she was only fifteen at the time.62 The next year 
his first son, Juan Pablo, was born.63 He would later change his name and move to 
Argentina to escape his father’s legacy. He never failed to provide for his family and 
friends, sharing his enormous wealth with everyone around him. Nothing was more 
important to him than his family and he is remembered as a caring father. He was known 
to hide away from his children when he smoked his joints.64 Years later, according to 
statements from Juan Pablo, when on the run from authorities, he burned stacks of cash 
worth US$2 million in order to keep his daughter, Manuela, warm at night.65 
 Escobar dedicated himself and his overflowing resources to establishing civic 
development programs aimed to alleviate the suffering of Medellín’s poor. His first 
project was Civismo en Marcha,66 a radio show and civic welfare program that he began 
in 1979 with his uncle, Hernando Gaviria. It worked to plant trees along avenues, build 
and develop sports facilities and established a medical office for low-income individuals. 
He constructed lighting towers in around one hundred soccer fields and was always 
present at their inaugurations. His uncle’s newspaper, Medellín Cívico, published stories 
of their work under the title “In the public neighborhoods night became day.” The issue 	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65 Gerard Couzens, “Colombian druglord Pablo Escobar 'burned £1.2million in cash to keep his daughter 
warm during single night on the run,'” MailOnline, November 3, 2009. 
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contained an eloquently crafted statement from Escobar, as was typical of his public 
rhetoric: 
Me angustió siempre ver en los barrios populares a los niños a jóvenes 
exponiendo su vida al correr detrás de un balón por las calles cruzadas de raudos 
automotores —decía  Pablo— Soñaba con el día en que esta juventud tuviera 
estadios propios para poder jugar sin humillarse ante nadie ni exponerse a un 
accidente. Así nació mi vocación por la creación de los campos deportivos. Hoy 
construimos canchas para fútbol, basketball, voleibol y polideportivos, ojalá 
mañana podamos extender nuestra acción para campos de béisbol, para piscinas y 
gimnasios a montón, para el pueblo.67 
 
Escobar’s most famous civic program was Medellín sin tugurios (Medellín 
without slums), which included the construction of Barrio Pablo Escobar. The slum 
neighborhood of Moravia was built around a dump. Its inhabitants lived among the 
mountains of trash, picking scrap items out of the refuse dumped by the garbage trucks. 
Escobar was disgusted and appalled at the conditions the people were living in. Only a 
few days after his first encounter there, the neighborhood caught fire, destroying the 
decrepit houses. He immediately went about organizing a plan and soon announced that 
he would build a thousand houses for the inhabitants.68 
 Barrio Pablo Escobar still exists today, housing 12,700 people in 2,800 homes. 
Its residents are Escobar’s most fervent admirers who remember him as a hero and savior. 
A mural is painted on the side of a building, featuring Escobar’s face and reading 
“Welcome to Barrio Pablo Escobar. Here there is peace.”69 More images of Escobar are 
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spray painted on walls and buildings with the caption “San Pablo” (“Saint Pablo”).70 For 
the documentary, Pablo Escobar: ángel o demonio, one woman who lives in the barrio 
was interviewed. She showed the filmmakers a framed image of Escobar, explaining that 
the two people she admires most are her mother who gave her life and Escobar who gave 
her a home. She calls him her husband because she says he was the only man who ever 
provided for her. 
 Escobar had developed a public relationship with the Catholic Church, which 
supported his social programs. His housing project had the blessing of the Church and he 
was known walk around the slums accompanied by two priests. He would also donate 
money to build roads and electrical lines, effectively investing more in his community 
than the government did. Sometime when he made public appearances in the slums, for 
the inauguration of a new project for example, he would hand out cash to the residents.71 
When speaking publicly or to the media, he would often highlight his humble generosity, 
his connection to the popular class, and his patriotism: 
En 1968 me vinculé a la Junta Cívica de mi barrio. Muchas veces he echado pico 
y pala alegre y sudoroso. Desde pequeño tuve la obsesión por las escuelas, tal vez 
porque soy hijo de una abnegada educadora que ama su profesión. Cuando 
ayudamos a construir escuelas parece que nos reencontráramos con la patria que 
anhelamos. Hemos visto con dolor a muchos niños sentados sobre adobes, en 
locales destartalados, y a los maestros viviendo sin ninguna protección ante la 
indiferencia del Estado. Queremos a Colombia y ahora que estamos en capacidad 
de devolverle algo de lo que nos ha dado esta bella patria, lo estamos haciendo.72 
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 He used his popularity to gain an audience for his campaign against extradition, 
hosting a forum where he denounced the treaty Colombia had signed with the United 
States in 1979, claiming it violated Colombia’s national sovereignty.73 When Escobar 
began campaigning for election to public office, this would be his primary agenda. He 
began consciously and thoroughly scrubbing his record, trying to remove any evidence 
linking him to illegal activities. He hired publicists to cultivate his public image as a 
benevolent and generous friend of the poor and paid journalists to write stories that shed 
him in the best light possible. He made extensive use of his uncle’s newspaper to 
distribute positive representations of himself: 
“Yes I remember him,” one Escobar admirer said in its pages. “His hands, almost 
priestlike, drawing parabolas of friendship and generosity in the air. Yes I know 
him, his eyes weeping because there is not enough bread for all the nation’s 
dinner tables. I have watched his tortured feelings when he sees street children – 
angels with out toys, without a present, without a future.”74 
 
 In April of 1983, Semana magazine, one of Colombia’s most prominent 
publications, published a story on Escobar titled “A paisa Robin Hood”,75 featuring his 
passion for social improvement, his collection of exotic animals and his campaign against 
extradition. “Who is Don Pablo, this sort of paisa Robin Hood, that arouses so much 
excitement among hundreds of wretches that reflect in their faces a sudden hope that is 
not easy to explain in the midst of this sordid environment.”76 The article spoke of his 
enormous wealth, citing that an “important north American magazine” had listed him 
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among the five richest people in the world with a value of around US$5 billion, “whose 
origin never ceases to be an object of speculation.”77 
 With no public suspicion about his drug trafficking business, his previous arrests 
long forgotten in the piles of old records, Escobar’s popularity was soaring. In 1978 he 
was elected to a substitute position on the Medellín city council. In 1980 he supported the 
creation of the New Liberal Party, lead by a popular progressive politician named Luis 
Carlos Galán. In 1982, on the New Liberal Party ticket, he was elected as an alternate to 
Envigado representative Jairo Ortega. Although it was just a substitute position, he was a 
congressman nonetheless. He received automatic judicial immunity, meaning he could 
not be prosecuted under Colombian law, as well as a diplomatic visa, which allowed him 
to travel to the United States where he bought a mansion in Miami.78	  
 Galán’s party, on one hand, seemed like a natural fit for Escobar. He was 
outspoken against corruption and the political oligarchy and was popular among the 
lower class as a reformer, a position that Escobar could have identified with. On the other 
hand, he also publicly denounced the drug traffickers and any politician who accepted 
their money or support, which at the time didn’t leave many with clean hands. Escobar 
himself was believed to have contributed to both Belisario Bentacur’s and Gabriel 
Turbay’s campaigns for president in 1978.79 Perhaps Escobar thought he could go on 
hiding the elephant in the room indefinitely.	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PART IV 
WASHINGTON’S CONSTRUCTION OF ESCOBAR 
 For a long time the typical Colombian position on drug trafficking seemed to be 
quietly tolerant. Not only did the traffickers bring in billions of dollars that they invested 
in Colombia,80 they also appeared to function as a buffer against the leftist guerrilla 
organizations that aimed to upend the status quo. They represented the aspirations of 
many Colombians who felt alienated and abandoned by the oligarchy; the traffickers had 
been born with nothing and climbed their way to the top. After all, some of Colombia’s 
wealthiest and most prominent families had won their fortunes by illegal means, 
smuggling gold, emeralds or tobacco, trading slaves, or seizing properties during the civil 
wars and conflicts of the past two centuries. Some simply saw cocaine as a new export, 
one that transferred wealth from north to south on a massive scale. Alberto Villamazar, 
Colombia’s first Anti-Kidnapping Chief, later said, “I think that in the beginning of the 
80’s Colombian society was very permissive of drug trafficking… It was seen more like 
an almost folkloric phenomenon… People were having a lot of fun.”81 The traffickers 
represented a new social class, one that was young, rich, and fashionable.  
Most politicians were not eager to tackle the drug issue since many of them were 
getting a slice of the profits too. President Gabriel Turbay Ayala, a Liberal elected in 
1978, was widely suspected of accepting money from the traffickers. However, he did 
cooperate with the United States’ anti-drug efforts, which where then mostly aimed at the 
eradication of marijuana but by that time marijuana cultivation was already gradually 
being replaced by coca. Colombian traffickers had discovered that cocaine was far more 	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profitable and easier to transport, plus more marijuana was being grown within the 
United States, reducing the overall demand.82 Still, the U.S. interference was very 
unpopular among most Colombians and so was the extradition treaty that Turbay signed 
in 1979. 
President Belisario Betancur, elected in 1982, was notably silent on the drug issue 
during the first part of his term. His primary agenda was to seek peace with Colombia’s 
notorious guerrillas, his second was to begin a program of economic and social reforms 
particularly aimed at improving housing and education. “Drug trafficking hardly made 
Betancur’s list. It was a back-burner item, of concern largely because it bothered the 
gringos so much. Betancur was very against drug trafficking when he thought about it, 
but he didn’t think about it very often.” He also stated that he was “philosophically 
opposed” to extradition of Colombian nationals.83 Nationalists like Betancur saw the 
United States’ pushing of the extradition agenda as an example of imperialist policies and 
an infringement of Colombia’s sovereignty. 
During the 1970’s even the United States wasn’t terribly concerned with the drug 
issue. Its primary concern in Latin America during the Cold War era was the containment 
of communism. Regarding this issue, the two countries shared a warm relationship; 
Colombia, unlike many Latin American nations, had effectively controlled the expansion 
and influence of leftist ideologies through the National Front policies that kept political 
power in the hand of the elites. It welcomed U.S. assistance in combating the leftist 
guerrillas and the United States saw Colombia as a reliable and valuable ally against 
communism in the region. The drug issue was only one of many elements of US-	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Colombian relations. Viron P. Vaky, the American ambassador to Colombia from 1974-
76, said “It [the drug issue] was there. We had DEA guys in the embassy but it was not a 
central element of our policy. At the time there were no cartels and little to no 
involvement in the cocaine trade… No one saw it [U.S. drug policy] reaching the 
proportions that it did.”84 
 Cocaine trafficking would not fly under the radar for much longer though. When 
President Reagan was inaugurated in 1981, he moved to make drugs the top priority in 
the United States’ foreign policy to Colombia. Americans were getting worked up about 
the drug problem that was increasingly becoming an issue in their own backyards. The 
presence of drug traffickers in the United States corresponded with increased levels of 
violent crime, especially in places like Miami where large quantities were entering the 
country and rival gangs fought over control of the market. At the same time, large 
numbers of hispanics began migrating north, often crossing the border illegally, and 
many Americans started to become very vocal against the new wave of unwelcome 
immigrants. Cocaine, which had previously been an expensive and fashionable drug of 
choice for the upper class, “lost all its stylishness when it started showing up on the city 
streets in its cheap, smokable form, crack.”85 The rhetoric for the “War on Drugs” was 
increasing in intensity, as evidenced by Nancy Reagan’s “Just Say No” campaign.  
In January of 1982, President Reagan established a cabinet-level task force to 
handle the United States’ counternarcotics efforts, especially in southern Florida where 
most of the illegal drugs entered the country, and appointed Vice President George Bush 
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as its leader.86 That year DEA agents in Florida received a tip that a large cocaine 
shipment would be coming in on flight operated by a small Colombian air cargo company. 
The packages, labeled as “JEANS,” all contained kilos of pure cocaine. The seizure 
totaled 3,609 pounds with an estimated wholesale value of US$100 million. It was far 
more than any of the agents ever expected to find and was four times the size of the 
previous record cocaine seizure. The DEA was stunned at the scale and what it implied; 
that the different drug traffickers must have been cooperating with each other to 
orchestrate a shipment of this magnitude.87 In 1976, the DEA had estimated that between 
14 and 19 metric tons of cocaine crosses the border into the United States. By 1982 that 
estimate had shot upwards of 45 metric tons entering the country per year.88 It was 
around this time, when officials became aware of the Medellín cartel, that Washington 
and the DEA switched its efforts from trying to intercept drugs entering the country to 
targeting the high-level traffickers in Colombia. 
In 1983 Reagan assigned Lewis Tambs, a professor of Latin American History, to 
the position of Ambassador to Colombia. Tambs was assertive and firmly anticommunist, 
although he had been instructed to make the drug issue a priority.89 Tambs, likely chosen 
for his demanding and at times overbearing nature, became a key tool that Washington 
used to exert increasing political influence on the Betancur administration. In June of that 
year a secret CIA report speculated that several of Colombia’s leftist guerrilla 
organizations had developed ties with the drug trafficking groups, protecting the 
traffickers’ growing areas and shipments and using the money paid to them to buy 	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weapons.90 Establishing a link between drug traffickers and communism made the issue 
even hotter in Washington and Tambs began to apply more pressure on the Betancur 
administration to respond. If the drug traffickers and leftist guerrillas were working 
together, they represented a direct threat to the United States’ interests in Colombia and 
Washington would do whatever it took to eliminate that danger. Tambs began using the 
term “narco-guerrillas” to refer to the apparent cooperation between the drug traffickers 
and the leftist organizations and to further push Washington’s anti-drug agenda.91 
However, Bentacur opposed the United States’ interventionist policy and continued 
refusing to enforce the 1979 extradition treaty. Only a couple years earlier the drug 
traffickers had openly waged war against the M-19. Most Colombians thought the idea of 
an alliance between the guerrillas and the traffickers was Washington’s creative invention 
designed to justify interfering in Colombia’s domestic policies. Betancur himself 
repeatedly chastised Tambs for what he considered oversteps into Colombia’s internal 
affairs.92 Additionally, a priority on Betancur’s agenda was to work towards establishing 
peace with the guerrillas and Washington’s interference was not only complicating the 
process but it was putting Betancur’s political success and legitimacy at risk.93 
Around 1983, Escobar caught the attention of the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration and became the subject of investigation. In August of that same year, 
Rodrigo Lara Bonilla was appointed as Colombia’s Minister of Justice. He made it his 
mission to target corruption in Colombian politics and to expose the politicians who were 
on the drug traffickers’ payroll. Tambs and other U.S. officials had long been frustrated 
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by the apparent complacency in the Colombian government when it came to the drug 
issue, so naturally they were very eager to encourage Lara’s initiative, even if many 
Colombian politicians were staunchly unsupportive. 
Within only a few years, Escobar would become a notorious figure in the 
American media and his villainous portrayal, along with the well-publicized crack 
cocaine problem, would help boost domestic support for Washington’s counter-narcotics 
intervention abroad. In 1987 a photograph of him appeared with Fabio Ochoa on the 
cover of The New York Times Magazine with the title “Cocaine Billionaires: The Men 
Who Hold Colombia Hostage.”94 The same magazine featured several stories over the 
years on Escobar’s campaign of violence against Colombian politicians. His reputation 
for large scale acts of violent terrorism even briefly earned him a place as a suspect in the 
1993 World Trade Center bombing, which he quickly denied. “’They can take me off the 
list,’ he told the American Ambassador in a letter, ‘because if I had done it, I would be 
saying why and I would be saying what I want.’”95 
In 1987 a poll published by CBS News and the New York Times in 1988 showed 
that 48% of Americans believed that illegal drugs represented the United States’ biggest 
foreign policy challenge and 63% thought the drug issue was more important than 
containing communism.96 Washington’s agenda was to eradicate drugs at their source, 
arguing that it would be the cheapest and most effective action,97 which made it a foreign 
policy issue. In April of 1986, President Reagan signed National Security Decision 
Directive 221, which made drug trafficking a matter of national security and thereby 	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authorized military involvement in counter-narcotics efforts.98 From that point on, U.S. 
counter-narcotics efforts abroad became increasingly militarized. In 1989, President Bush 
announced his Andean Initiative plan, which made the Andean region, especially 
Colombia, the largest receiver of U.S. military aid.99 As another means to coerce 
international cooperation in the War on Drugs, the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
established a drug certification process that made countries cooperate with Washington’s 
counter-narcotics efforts in order to be eligible to receive military and economic aid. That 
meant that Colombia had to follow Washington’s plan, which usually involved military 
involvement and spraying chemical herbicides, or else it would be denied the resources it 
needed to combat the drug traffickers. Colombia was decertified in 1996 and again in 
1997 under the Samper administration for failure to cooperate, upsetting the Colombian 
people although he was able to promote himself as a guardian of Colombia’s 
sovereignty.100 The Colombian people and government were frustrated and felt 
manipulated by the United States’ heavy involvement and pressure within their country 
and felt that the focus on foreign drug eradication over reducing demand at home was 
hypocritical and counter-productive. President Turbay himself said, “Colombians are not 
corrupting Americans. You are corrupting us. If you abandon illegal drugs, the traffic will 
disappear.”101 
In July of 1992, shortly after Escobar escaped from his private prison after his 
brief surrender, a Joint Hearing of the Committee of Foreign Affairs was held addressing 
the future of the War on Drugs after Escobar’s escape. The rhetoric against Escobar and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Bowden, 55. 
99 Crandall, 34. 
100 Ibid., 42. 
101 Bagley, 81. 
	   48	  
the drug traffickers was intense. Robert Torricellli, Chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Western Hemisphere Affairs said, “The flow of drugs from Colombia is no different from 
an assault on our shores.” Another speaker called the drug lords a “sickness in society.” 
Torricelli argued: 
The drug kingpins who are responsible for the narcotics flowing into our country, 
our cities, our schools, must be taken out of commission. If Colombia is unable to 
do that… then we will have to revisit the issue of extradition. And if we cannot to 
that, then the United States must reserve the right of unilateral action to itself, 
whether covert or overt or otherwise, to win this fight.102 
 
As the War on Drugs was escalating in US-Colombian relations during the late 
80’s, the war against communism was winding down in other parts of the world. Without 
the threat of communist infiltration, the United States was left without a global mission or 
an enemy to unite against.  Jorge Castañeda, former Mexican Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs and a scholar of US-Latin American relations wrote: “Gorbachev has left the 
United States without an adversary in an area where the enemy, while undeniably real, 
was never as present, nor as overwhelming, as the Unites States made him out to be.” 
Soon the moral battle against the international scourge of illegal drugs would fill the 
“ideological void” left by the disappearing communist threat.103  Even	  though	  few	  who	  thought	  seriously	  about	  the	  drug	  problem	  believed	  it	  could	  be	  stopped	  or	  even	  curbed	  by	  arresting	  a	  few	  cartel	  bosses,	  it	  proved	  a	  lot	   easier	   to	   get	   the	   U.S.	   Congress	  worked	   up	   about	   a	   cabal	   of	   billionaires	  infecting	   America’s	   youth	   than	   about	   the	   amorphous	   smuggling	   problem.	  Marshalling	   public	   support	   for	   war,	   or	   even	   just	   war	   spending,	   requires	  enemies,	  and	  Colombian	  cocaine	  barons	  colorfully	  fit	  the	  description.104	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The United States, rather than focusing on reducing the demand for drugs at home, would 
direct its efforts towards attacking drugs at their source by eradicating crops and targeting 
high-level drug traffickers. Escobar and the other traffickers would quickly become the 
face of the enemy in the United States’ drug crusade. 
 
BOGOTÁ’S DEBUNKING OF THE ROBIN HOOD IMAGE 
Despite the increasingly negative opinion of drug traffickers in the United States, 
Escobar was still living large in Colombia. The War on Drugs was not hurting his 
business. He had wealth, popularity, and a political career that granted him a position as 
an accepted member of Colombian society. However his glory would be short-lived. The 
favor of the Colombian political elites proved much more difficult to buy than that of the 
urban poor, especially when the United States was steadily increasing its pressure for 
them to denounce the drug traffickers and their money.  
 Escobar found a formidable enemy in Lara as the new Minister of Justice. The 
1982 election that had put Betancur in office and gotten Escobar a seat as a congressman 
was tainted by accusations of accepting drug money from both sides. The hot money 
scandal was gaining national attention. Surprisingly, it was Escobar’s own party, the New 
Liberal Party headed by Galán that was especially vocal on the issue. Lara was young and 
ambitious. He took on the investigation of the accusations, knowing that a successful 
campaign would benefit his career enormously. He had the support of Tambs and 
Washington who shared his interest in exposing the influence of the drug traffickers in 
politics. Only a shortly before he exposed Escobar in front of the Colombian congress, 
the DEA had begun its investigation into Representative Escobar and his connection with 
the Medellín cartel. 
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Lara openly suggested that Escobar’s career, as well as that of several others 
associated with him, was funded by drug money. When Escobar came to the Bogotá to 
address the accusation in August of 1983, Lara singled him out directly in the chamber of 
the House of Representatives, informing the chamber of the investigations being 
undertaken in the United States regarding Escobar’s “criminal conduct.”105 There was a 
political backlash against Escobar and the drug traffickers. His social reputation had been 
tainted. His visa was revoked and he was kicked out of the New Liberal Party. Galán and 
Lara publicly denounced him and all politicians who had linked to drug trafficking in 
front on thousands of people in Medellín, the base of Escobar’s support network.106 He 
would not forget Galán’s insult either. 
Only days later, the newspaper El espectador published a story written by the 
editor, Guillermo Cano, exposing Escobar’s arrest records from 1976.  
The substitute representative to the Chamber for the santofimismo107, Pablo 
Escobar Gavirira, figures among the six individuals captured June 9th, 1976 in the 
Antioqueño locality of Itagüí with a load of 39 pounds of cocaine as a culmination 
of an operative mounted by the branch office of the Antioquia DAS.108 
 
 Escobar, in a desperate attempt to salvage his public image, ordered his men to go 
out and buy every last copy of the edition to keep the news from spreading, but it was 
already too late. The story was being broadcast on radio and television and other 
newspapers had picked it up as well.109 Even the American media got a hold of he story; 
ABC-TV presented a documentary on Pablo Escobar, Colombia’s richest drug 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Bowden, 37. 
106 Salazar, 92. 
107 The supporters of Liberal Senator Alberto Santofimio, an influential politician and ally of Escobar and 
Ortega who was known to be associated with the drug traffickers. 
108 Ibid., 118. Quote translated here by writer. 
109 Ibid., 119. 
	   51	  
trafficker.110 Escobar had evaded punishment for the 1976 arrest, but after the public 
scandal the case was reopened that September. The judge handling the case ordered 
Escobar arrested for conspiracy to murder the DAS agents who had arrested him. Senator 
Alberto Santofimio, who Escobar publicly supported, requested that he resign from 
politics and surrender his diplomatic immunity, but at that point his congressional seat 
was the only thing protecting him from the justice system.111 Lara and his allied 
continued their efforts to expose the drug traffickers. Newspapers got a hold of records of 
Escobar’s car thefts and then he was fined US$5000 for illegally importing wild animals 
to Hacienda Nápoles.112 The fine was insignificant, but the message was clear; Colombia 
had turned its back on Pablo Escobar. 
In January he formally announced his retirement from politics, although he was 
not officially removed from his seat until December.113 His issued a public statement in 
which he promised to continue fighting against injustice and denounced the political 
oligarchy, declaring “los apremios y dolencias populares están distantes de la 
sensibilidad de los políticos cuyas egoístas miradas sólo se encuentran fijas en retocar 
sus deterioradas imágenes narcisistas y acrecentar sus tambaleantes feudos podridos.”114 
In March he held a political rally where he called Lara an accomplice of Washington’s 
imperialist plot in Colombia.115 For the rest of his life Escobar would always vilify the 
politicians who opposed him, painting them as corrupt tools of the imperialist gringos, 
and validate himself as a man of the people who was unjustly persecuted.  	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A couple of months later, the Colombian National Police with assistance from 
Lara and U.S. forces carried out a raid on a cocaine-processing center hidden deep in the 
jungle known as Tranquilandia. They found and destroyed seven airplanes and airstrips, 
12,000 drums of chemicals and an estimated US$1 billion worth of cocaine. Escobar and 
the cartel could not tolerate such embarrassment and violation. Only weeks later in April 
of 1984, Lara was assassinated in the street by a group of sicarios, initiating a nationwide 
political and police campaign against Escobar and the drug traffickers.116 Killing the 
country’s Minister of Justice was an offense that could not be ignored. Guillermo Cano 
wrote of the traffickers in El espectador, “For some time now these sinister men have 
managed to create and empire of immorality, tricking and making fools of the complacent, 
doling out crumbs and bribes upon them while a cowardly and often entranced populace 
stood idly by, content with their illusions and entertained by stories of their jet set 
lives.”117 President Betancur spoke at Lara’s funeral, where he declared that he would 
move to enforce extradition of drug traffickers, stating “Colombia will hand over 
criminals wanted in other countries so they may be punished as an example.”118 Escobar 
fled to Panama with several other traffickers where Manuel Noriega, then the commander 
of the army, had offered them safe haven in exchange for US$4 million.119 Extradition to 
the United States, his worst fear, had now become a real possibility. In less than a year 
Escobar had gone from being Medellín’s most popular benefactor to its most wanted 
criminal. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Bowden, 44. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Gugliotta and Leen, 144. 
119 Bowden, 45. 
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 The Colombian elites had never admired Escobar the way the poor had, but 
merely tolerated him and accepted his financial contributions. No Colombian officials 
believed in the construction that Escobar presented of himself as a generous benefactor 
and good-will citizen. Former President César Gaviria spoke of his “enormous capacity 
to manipulate the public” through his charity work, although he also denied the idea that 
many Colombians admired Escobar.120 Andrés Pastrana, president from 1998 to 2002, 
also affirmed the belief that Escobar’s charity was a selfishly motivated ploy to “buy the 
consciences of the poor” and ensure his personal security.121 When Escobar sought public 
office, however, he threatened to disrupt the status quo and the ruling class could not 
accept him, especially amidst increasing pressure and influence from Washington. The 
elites felt no loyalty towards him and by assassinating Lara he cemented his identity in 
their minds as a bandido and an enemy of the state. 
 
PERSECUTING THE BANDIDO 
 From their hold out in Panama, Escobar and the other traffickers began to pursue 
negotiations for an amnesty deal, desperate to avoid extradition at all costs. Former 
President Alfonso López Michelsen met Escobar and Jorge Ochoa in Panama City at 
their request and they presented a letter to President Betancur. They denied any 
involvement in Lara’s murder, but admitted that they represented up to 80% of the 
cocaine trade and an annual income of US$2 billion. They offered to dismantle their 
entire operation, move all of their money held in Swiss banks back to Bogotá, and even 
offered their assistance in putting and end to all drug trafficking activity in Colombia on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Pablo Escobar: ángel o demonio. Statement translated here by writer. 
121 Ibid. Statement translated here by writer. 
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the condition that they could keep their money and they would be guaranteed freedom 
from extradition.122 It was rumored that they even offered to pay off Colombia’s US$10 
billion national debt. The U.S. embassy and a growing number of Colombian politicians 
strongly opposed even engaging the trafficker’s requests and Betancur ignored their offer. 
 Escobar would not accept no for an answer. He famously declared “Better a tomb 
in Colombia that a prison cell in the United States.”123 His strategy was always the same; 
plata o plomo. If he couldn’t buy his protection from extradition, he would eliminate who 
ever threatened him with it. In 1985, Ambassador Tambs left Colombia after a car bomb 
exploded outside his home in Bogotá and the judge investigating the case of Lara’s 
murder was killed. Later that year, Escobar’s elderly father was kidnapped, but he was 
released unharmed with no ransom paid only weeks later after Escobar’s sicarios “turned 
Medellín inside out.” Despite being wanted for arrest in Colombia, he returned to 
Medellín, confident that he could evade the authorities.124 He offered to turn himself in 
again on the same conditions as before, but the government refused again. 
 He revived his public campaigns against extradition, forming an organization 
called “the Extraditables” that acted on his behalf issuing statements and letters written to 
politicians and judges. The communiqués denounced extradition as a violation of 
Colombia’s sovereignty, “the vilest of outrages,” and threatened “absolute and total war” 
against the political leaders.125 Judges received letters promising the death of their 
families if they did not rule extradition unconstitutional. The threats were effective; over 
thirty judges had been murdered since Lara’s death and the rest were truly worried. In 
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November 1985 the M-19 stormed the Palace of Justice is Bogotá and demanded that the 
Supreme Court repudiate the extradition treaty. They also destroyed Escobar’s criminal 
cases files among thousands of others. In the aftermath, eleven justices were dead along 
with fifty employees and forty guerrillas. Escobar supposedly paid the organization 
US$ 1 million to carry out the attack. In 1986 the Supreme Court declared the treaty 
invalid on the technicality that it had been signed by a delegate and not the president, 
although new President Virgilio Barco reinstated the treaty only days later.126 However, 
Escobar continued making and enforcing threats, usually under the identity of the 
Extraditables. Guillermo Cano, editor of El espectador who had spoken out against the 
traffickers, was killed, and the judge handling his case received a letter from the 
Extraditables warning “We are capable of executing you at any place on this planet.”127 
He remained in Medellín where he felt safe, protected by a network of supporters that 
remained loyal to him. He repeatedly escaped police and military raids, always being 
tipped off, likely by sources on the inside. 
 Escobar had made other attempts to negotiate a settlement with the government 
but was always refused. Each time he was denied the retaliation got worse. Luis Galán, 
Escobar’s old enemy, was running for the presidency for the 1990 election with a fierce 
anti-drug campaign. Knowing that Galán’s election would end his chances of ever 
defeating extradition, Escobar ordered a hit. In August of 1989 Galán was shot by a 
sicario while speaking to supporters in Soacha, south of Bogotá. His successor, César 
Gaviria, who would be elected president, survived an assassination attempt in which 
Escobar’s men planted a bomb on an airplane he was supposed to be on, killing one 	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hundred and ten people.128 Then Escobar went after the politicians personally, kidnapping 
the daughter of former president Turbay and the sister of former president Barco’s Chief 
of Staff; both women were killed. In the first months of 1991 Colombia was experiencing 
on average twenty murders every day.129 In June of that year, the Constitutional 
Assembly voted to outlaw extradition and Escobar turned himself in.130 As part of the 
terms of his surrender, worked out by his lawyers, he only confessed to the crime of 
participating in a French drug deal arranged by his then dead cousin.131 The other of his 
terms guaranteed that he would be housed in his own private prison, that he constructed 
himself, staffed by his personal guards. President Gaviria, desperate to end the bloodshed, 
had accepted the terms. 
 During this campaign of violence against the state, Escobar had become an 
infamous figure in American media as well. There was no shortage of material for 
reporters and journalists to use to construct an image of Escobar as a supremely powerful 
and violent super villain that terrorized Colombia, but the dramatic saga of the battle 
between the criminal and the authorities and the extravagant lifestyle of the drug 
traffickers also held a sort of popular appeal. The figure of the Latin American drug lord 
was glamorized in films like Scarface, released in 1983, becoming a pop culture icon. 
The TV series Miami Vice, airing from 1984-1990, dramatized the detectives’ and police 
officers’ struggle against drug dealers in southern Florida. The position of the United 
States government and the national media regarding the issue was clearly reflected in 
their villainous portrayal of Escobar. 
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 One of his first appearances on American television was the 1983 special on ABC, 
aired shortly after Lara had exposed Escobar in the Chamber of Representatives, called 
“The Cocaine Cartel.” It described Escobar as “one of the richest men in the world” and 
claimed he shipped 1,100 pounds of cocaine into the United States each month. The 
program also highlighted on the violence the cocaine brought with it, mentioning 
“Colombian gunmen, who use semiautomatic weapons, are renowned for their ferocity. 
‘They will kill the mother, father, children, whoever is around,’ says a policeman…”132 
In 1987 Escobar first appeared on Forbes Magazine’s Billionaire List with an estimated 
net worth of around US$3 billion, although in later years that estimate would be higher. 
His biography described his ascension from a street criminal to a cocaine baron, also 
including his association with public charity work and his reputation for violence. He 
remained a constant figure on the list every year until his death in 1993.133 
 While staying in his private prison, La Catedral, he continued living quite 
extravagantly. He had visitors often and police could only monitor and report the flow of 
people and contraband into the prison.134 He received letters of support on a daily basis 
from the poor Colombians who were still loyal to him. The whole time he continued to 
blame the government for what he considered unjust persecution, orchestrated by 
Washington. In handwritten notes later discovered by police, he blamed the “’gringos’ 
who had ‘forced, by means of economic pressure, a government of slaves to engage in a 
fratricidal war against the so-called drug cartels.”135 He once said to his lawyer that after 
experiencing the terror and bloodshed of la Violencia, he had come to realize that 	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terrorism “was the atomic bomb of the poor people. It is the only way for the poor to 
strike back.”136  
 President Gaviria had been somewhat accommodating in his negotiations with the 
drug traffickers but had taken a harder line against the United States’ interference and 
criticism of Colombia’s counternarcotics efforts and the relationship between the two 
countries cooled significantly. U.S. officials were pressuring the Gaviria administration 
to do something about Escobar’s luxurious “prison” and lax rule enforcement. The final 
straw came when two of Escobar’s former business partners went missing and were 
presumed dead after visiting La Catedral. Escobar’s prison conditions and his behavior 
was an embarrassment to the Colombian justice system and in July of 1992 President 
Gaviria ordered him transferred to a prison in Bogotá.137 However, Escobar found out 
about the plan and took hostages, refusing to allow himself to be transferred. In the chaos 
that ensued, Escobar escaped, which was a humiliation for the Colombian government 
and armed forces. 
He would be on the run for the next year and a half, usually hiding out in 
Medellín where he was protected. He continually communicated with the press and 
proclaimed his innocence, while simultaneously his car bombs wrecked havoc in Bogotá. 
Colombian and American Special Forces cooperated in a nationwide manhunt, 
employing every means available to locate the fugitive. Finally, on December 2, 1993, 
one day after Escobar’s 44th birthday, he was surrounded in a house in Los Olivos, a 
neighborhood in Medellín. In the midst of the shootout, he was shot and killed while 
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running across a rooftop, although his brother and some others believe that he instead 
killed himself to rob his persecutors of the satisfaction.138 
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CONCLUSION 
 Escobar’s dramatic story is reminiscent of those of the bandidos of la Violencia, 
like Efraín González and Chispas who despite attempts to gain amnesty were eventually 
hunted down and killed by the authorities. The bandidos, Escobar included, were outlaws 
and violent criminals by definition, but they also represented a cause to the people who 
supported them and were protected by them. When that cause was in opposition to the 
ruling authority they became more than just wanted criminals, they became victims of 
political persecution to further the government’s agenda. Escobar was undoubtedly a 
dangerous criminal and a threat to public security, but he was also a pawn in a much 
larger political game. 
 When he died, many Colombians rejoiced and celebrated the end of a terribly 
violent era and Americans applauded the accomplishment as a great step forward in 
combating the illegal drug trade. Thousands of other Colombians mourned the loss of 
their hero and protector, the one person that defended cared for them in a system that 
excluded them from any hope for improvement. At his funeral, the mob of mourners 
seized his coffin and carried it to the gravesite. They cried out “Viva Pablo” and praised 
his generosity, calling the police murderers and asking what would they do now without 
anyone or anything to help them. The crowd of mourners pushed against each other to 
reach out and touch his coffin.139 One photo even shows the lid being lifted as they 
fought for one last glimpse.140 
 Escobar’s social constructions have not only outlived him, but have grown and 
strengthened since his death. American media, including documentaries, books, and TV 	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140 See Appendix X: Image.	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specials, as well as the Colombian press, presents Escobar as a ruthless terrorist and an 
enemy of the state who killed thousands of innocent people. This construction ignores his 
generous charity work, or dismisses it as a dishonest strategy to manipulate the public. 
His character has grown to legendary proportions, becoming one of the most famous 
criminals of all time for the scale of his devastation and terrible power. Yet in popular 
neighborhoods in Colombia, the people who supported him have preserved and 
strengthened his Robin Hood image. Since his death he has become like a martyr to them. 
Their construction portrays Escobar as the definitive outlaw hero; a reincarnation of the 
legendary bandidos of the past, except his legend is even more vivid and detailed. He 
came from the population of urban poor and made his success taking advantage of the 
vices of the wealthy. In turn, he generously shared his success with all of the people who 
the wealthy had exploited and disenfranchised, like a real life Robin Hood. When the 
authorities in Washington and Bogotá persecuted him for his noble crimes, as his 
supporters saw it, they became the villain of the story. 
 Escobar lives on as a glorious bandido in the lyrics of many narcocorridos, 
Mexican and Colombian ballads that romanticize the life of the outlaw. One seems to 
capture the essence of the Robin Hood legend that has grown around Escobar’s memory. 
Written by Colombian artist Uriel Henao, the title is “No soy culpable” (“I am not to 
blame): 
Yo era muy pobre, pero un día Dios lo dispuso 
que yo me fuera por el mundo a trajinar 
y sin pensar lo que dijeron los humanos, 
con valentía yo me puse a traficar. 
 
Yo soy mafioso pero a nadie le hago daño; 
lo que consigo lo reparto por igual; 
tengo dinero y me lo gasto en lo que quiero; 
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yo soy valiente pero a nadie le hago mal.141 
 
 As is always the case regarding figures like Escobar, each construction relies on a 
selective telling of the story and one’s social position. Those who tend to see the 
government as a corrupt oppressive force are more likely to see Escobar as a benevolent 
character and those who support the government will see Escobar as the enemy. Neither 
side presents the real, whole truth of Escobar’s identity. In the creation of a legend 
though, whether a legendary hero or a legendary villain, the truth doesn’t matter as much 
as the story and what it means to those who tell it. 
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Topographic map of Colombia showing departments and major cities. 
Colombia Physiography, 2008, Map, CIA Maps, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/cia-maps-
publications/Colombia.html.
	   67	  
APPENDIX II 
 
Map showing distribution of poverty in Antioquia department, 2006. 
Mapa de Pobreza, 2006, Map, Gobernación de Antioquia, http://antioquia.gov.co/antioquia-
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Map showing economic strata of neighborhoods in Medellín, 1997. 
Distribución de estratos socioeconómicos en Medellín, 1997, Map, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 
http://www.Medellín.unal.edu.co/habitat/galeria/albums/userpics/10005/normal_mapa01.jpg.
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The New York Times Magazine Cover, March 1987. 
The New York Times Magazine Cover, March 1987, Image, 
http://www.proyectopabloescobar.com/2011/04/portada-del-new-york-times-magazine.html.
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A woman holds a portrait of Escobar next to a mural that reads “Welcome to Barrio Pablo Escobar. Here 
there is peace.” Medellín. 
Andrés Henao, Barrio Pablo Escobar, 2012, Photograph, 
http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/medellin/ARTICULO-WEB-NEW_NOTA_INTERIOR-
12131722.html. 
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APPENDIX VI 
 
 
 
Graffiti in Barrio Pablo Escobar, Medellín. 
Photograph, http://www.lafm.com.co/noticias/colombia/11-08-12/el-barrio-pablo-escobar-ultimo-11.
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Pablo Escobar dressed as Pancho Villa. 
Photograph, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1224904/Colombian-druglord-Pablo-Escobar-burned-
1million-cash-daughter-warm-single-night-run.html. 
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Pablo Escobar at a Civismo en Marcha rally. 
Civismo en Marcha, 1979, Photograph, http://www.proyectopabloescobar.com/2011/06/civismo-en-
marcha.html. 
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“Un Robin Hood paisa,” Original article in Semana magazine. 
 
Un Robin Hood paisa, 1983, Photograph, http://www.proyectopabloescobar.com/2011/05/un-robin-hood-
paisa.html. 
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Mourners open Escobar’s coffin on the way to the burial. 
 
1993, Still Frame, http://www.telemundo52.com/videos/He-aqui-el-entierro-del-peor-capo-de-la-historia-
162441586.html. 
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